Abstract
Introduction

29
In recent years physicians have made an important effort to formalize medical protocols and forbids some medical decisions depending on the medical history and evolution of the 82 patient. Our system can be used for managing both suggested actions and constrained 83 actions. To be precise, suggestions are modeled as multiple possible actions and constraints 84 as forbidden actions. So, it can be used for managing both medical guidelines and MPs.
85
From now on, we refer to the more general term, i.e. MP.
86
To define a system for monitoring MPs, we make an abstraction of the real world, i.e.
87
hospital environment, in terms of a multi-agent system (MAS) [41, 45] . The main idea is to describes a negotiation process between multiple specialized domain agents for treating a 91 particular pathology and specifies behavior rules depending on specific symptoms.
92
To tackle this problem, the first step is to develop a tool and a representation model for Because of the private nature of most of the information exchanged in a hospital 101 environment, the communication layer must provide privacy, integrity and authentication 102 during the process of exchanging information between agents. Therefore, the third step is 103 to define a robust communication interface. Finally, in order to make our system fully 104 compliant with the existing medical records, we develop a database broker agent for 105 automatically recovering the medical history and evolution of patients.
106
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the concept of 107 dialogical institution and defines its two basic components, dialogical framework and 108 performative structure. Section 3 shows how a MP can be specified using this formalism. agent. Finally, in Section 11, we summarize our main results and point out our future work. the institution and the performative structure describes the set of protocols. In [29, 32, 7, 35] 124 the authors propose different approaches for modeling some particular institutions.
125
In what concerns our work, we think of agent-based institutions as a computational between the system agents, TL is the transition language that allows one to define the movements of agents between 158 scenes within a specific protocol, ML is the metalanguage used for restricting the agents behavior within a specific 160 protocol, and T is a model of time. executed by removing one token from each input place and depositing a token in each 1 The example of Section 3 uses this model of time. where id_scene 2 L is the scene identifier, fa 1 ; . . . ; a n g Agents describes the non-empty set of initial agents (i.e. the set of agents 238 that must be active when starting the execution of the scene), SDG is the scene dependence graph, BR is a set of rules that restrict the behavior of agents within the scene. Every behavior 241 rule is defined over the metalanguage ML and has the following general syntax:
where C is a Boolean expression built over the language L [ CL [ TL, and d i , i 2 f1; . . . ; ng with n ! 1, is a transition of the scene dependence graph.
248
All the system restrictions, as the rules of behavior and the initial set of agents, are checked 249 during the monitoring phase when executing a protocol. The execution of a scene starts at the initial node and finishes at a final node. institution.
268
The initial node of a scene dependence graph is an atomic state. A scene cannot be used 
277
In the following definition S denotes a finite set of scenes, A denotes a finite set of atomic 278 states, E denotes the designated external scene, Sync denotes a finite set of synchronism 279 states, and Pll denotes a finite set of parallel states. allowed transitions between the current scene and other scenes of the protocol.
285
The mapping r 1 is formalized as follows:
The mapping r 2 is formalized as follows:
The mapping r 2 must also satisfy the following constraints:
If r 2 ða; s; transitionÞ 2 Pll, where then transition is an arrival movement (i.e. an input transition).
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
299
The set of constraints imposed by the mappings r 1 and r 2 are checked during the protocol 300 specification.
301
Notice that neither mapping r 1 nor mapping r 2 restrict the number of transitions for a For illustrative purposes, we next describe an example of the use of our modeling 314 language to specify a real medical protocol for detecting and controlling hypertension. In our modeling language, the controlling phase of the hypertension protocol is specified 
The agents involved in the controlling scene are a patient, a physician and a nurse, and The behavior rules attached with states Pll 1 , S 4 , S 7 and S 10 are defined in an analogous way. 
368
That is, the scene dependence graph can be specified either by loading a textual description 
378
JAFDIS provides a unified frame for specifying all the components of a dialogical 379 institution. The frame is divided into four areas (see Fig. 3 ):
(1) The menu and the toolbar area.
(2) The tabPane area with two options: S (Scenes) and P (Paint). The S option shows the hierarchy structure of scenes that make up a protocol. The P option shows a drawing tool for graphically designing the scenes dependence 
389
The dialogical framework describes the basic components of the dialogical institution.
390
JAFDIS provides different dialog boxes for graphically specifying these components.
391
For illustrative purposes, we present the JAFDIS dialog boxes for agents management. can play different roles in the institution and a role can be associated with different agents,
395
JAFDIS provides a dialog box (see Fig. 6 ) for specifying the relations between roles and 396 agents.
397
The performative structure is the set of protocols of the dialogical institution. When and every node must be accessible and useful. A node is accessible when there is at least a In the rest of the paper we make a step towards the formalization of a MAS architecture, roles. On the other hand, it distributes MP specifications to SAs.
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
493
We group agent interactions in two phases. The first one (Fig. 9) includes agents 494 certification, agent addresses distribution and MPs delivery. The second one (Fig. 10) 4 From now on, by an agent we understand a SDA or an ASA. 
Communication interface
508
The private nature of most of the information exchanged in a hospital environment and 509 the need of authentication led us to use cryptographic tools that we incorporated into a 
520
Our approach is based on a certification authority architecture [22] . This architecture has 521 been used, instead of using a public key server approach, in order to avoid a full storage of 522 the public key of agents and a bottleneck in the system. The potential bottleneck would 523 obey to the fact that an agent, each time it must interact with a new one, must obtain the 524 public key of the new agent through the public key server. The certification authority (in 525 our system, the CA) creates certificates that are used by agents to exchange public keys 526 without contacting a public key server and avoiding congestion scenarios. An agent 527 conveys its public key information to another by transmitting its certificate. Then, the 528 receiver agent verifies that the certificate was created by the CA.
529
The main features of our implementation, outlined in Fig. 11 , are the following ones:
Communications are symmetrically encrypted by using the triple DES algorithm to 531 provide confidentiality. The symmetric encryption key is negotiated in every session. The negotiation of the symmetric key is performed by using the public key RSA to the plain message in order to provide authentication and integrity. The MAC is computed using a Message Digest (MD5) algorithm [36, 24] .
545
Once explained how the communication among agents achieves certain degree of security,
546
we will explain how certificates are distributed.
547
A certificate for an agent A, say C A , can be expressed as 
The main objective of this implementation has been to establish great similarities with 557 the usual transport level interfaces, i.e. sockets. The use of our interface differs from others 558 in the following points:
Additional parameters must be specified; for instance, sender keys and certificates. Additional error conditions have to be managed; for instance, authentication errors.
562
Finally, we describe how an agent should use the secure communication interface. The 563 steps that it must follow are the following ones:
(1) Open a socket as in conventional transport level interfaces.
(2) Set up the socket with some parameters: the agent identification, the agent private key 
Medical protocols server agent
574
Before specifying the services provided by the medical protocols server agent (MPSA), 575 we summarize the system specification of a MP. A MP is a unique identifier, a non-empty 576 set of scenes and an initial scene.
577
The components of a scene are:
A unique identifier. A scene dependence graph which specifies a negotiation process between SDAs. in the sense that they inform SDAs about all the possible and forbidden actions specified.
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
624
Although SDAs behavior is not restricted by SAs, SAs record SDAs anomalous decisions.
625
In some cases, a MP can specify a timeout for executing critical medical actions; for 626 instance, a biopsy has to be performed before 2 days. Thus, SAs control the elapsed time 627 between SDAs actions.
628
The most important benefit of defining specialized agents for monitoring MPs is that
629
SDAs do not need to be synchronized. To check forbidden and critical SDAs actions, it is 630 necessary to know the monitoring state, which must be the same for every SDA involved in 631 the MP execution. This information is centralized and maintained by SAs in our approach.
632
A more detailed description of SA functionalities is the following one:
As we have seen, the number of active SAs is not fixed in the system. Therefore, a SA In the next section we show how these system interaction processes are transparent to
664
SDAs. This allows SDAs to focus on the decision control based on the specific domain 665 knowledge.
666
Interagents
667
Two functional requirements of our system are that the monitoring process must be 668 transparent to SDAs and SDAs must be able to concurrently execute multiple MPs.
669
Interagents allow us to achieve such objectives by forwarding SDAs interactions to SAs When a SDA is executing a MP scene it can be necessary, temporally or definitively, to 674 interrupt the current scene and then execute a new MP scene. In Section 7 and 8 we have 675 described how the MPSA and SAs interact with interagents to perform entrances to MPs 676 scenes. Now, we describe how interagents perform exits from MPs scenes. As we have 677 seen, the system uniquely identifies every MP scene execution. When a SDA enters to a MP 678 scene execution, the interagent pushes the scene instance identifier and the SA address and retrieve information at a lower level. Therefore, to achieve an effective integration it is 700 necessary to provide a bridge between the execution and monitoring system and the 701 medical records management system.
702
In our framework, the bridge is provided as an autonomous SDA called database broker 
743
The prototype of the MAS architecture has been developed using a Java based 
